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The series of tax reforms undertaken by the Philippine gov-
ernment starting in the early 1970s came partly in response to
studies that indicated an overall regressivity of the country's tax sys-
tem. This had been the conclusion reachedby EditaTan in her 1975
incidence analysis of both taxes and government expenditures in
the'Philippines, and by the joint Executive-Legislative Tax Com-
mission in 1964, and again in 1974, by which time it was known as
the National Tax Research Center. This observed regressivity stems
mainly from the traditional heavy reliance on indirect taxation
(e.g_, sales and excise taxes) which has accounted for about 70
percent of government tax revenues.
The problem with indirect taxes is that their • efficiency and
equity effects tend to be in conflict. It is well-known to economists
that wel(aredistortions are minimized when taxes fall heaviest on
goods with low price elasticities of demand. But such goods also
tend to have low income elasticities of demand; thus, sales taxes
imposed on these .goods would tend to be regressive.This also im-
plies that salestaxes that are designed to be progressive (by taxing
goods with high income elasticities more heavily) are likely to result
in significant welfare losses to' the economy. Thus, developing
countries heavily reliant on indirect taxes are often faced wuth the
difficult task of balancing equity .and efficiency objectives, more
so than in higher income countries where direct income taxation
tends to be more predominant. The "ideal" tax system would be
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one that balances these two effects in a way that is consistent with
society's relative valuation of the two goals. But while the literature
on optimal taxation has yielded theoretical approaches to the prob-
lem, they have had limited practical applicability to implementors of
tax policy. _
For the policymaker, the task of choosing an appropriate tax
system is made simpler if the nature of the equity-efficiency trade-
off resulting from alternative tax structures is made explicit. The
feasibility of computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling now
permits an explicit and complete definition of these tradeoffs. With
the detailed information that is generated by a rnultisectoral CGE
simulation model, it becomes possible to describe with a fair amount
of detail the outcome of alternative tax policies (or other types of
economic policy, for that matter), including their revenue, efficiency
and equity effects.
The approach employed in this paper is to derive a frontier
• curve which defines the equity-efficiency tradeoff in the range of
feasible tax structures for the Philippines. In effect, the objective is
to be able to present tax policymakers with a menu of alternative
tax structures which would yield the best combinations of efficiency
and equity achievable for agiven target level of government revenue.
The choice, then, is madethrough the policymakers, and dependson
the relative valuations of the efficiency and equity objectives (i.e.,
the implicit social welfare function asperceived by the policymaker).
The analytical framework also permits an evaluation of the prevailing
tax structure and changes thereon vis-a-vis the equity-efficiency
frontier, giving an indication of the direction tax reforms should
take to improve both equity and efficiency effects of the Philippine
tax system.
The next section starts with a brief expositiOn of the method-
ology employed in the analysis. The "equity-efficiency frontier"
curves are then derived, and subsequently used in evaluating major
tax reforms undertaken in 1977 and 1981.
1. The literatureon optimaltaxation is rich in theoretical analyses (see
Sandmo1976for a survey).The closest to an operationally usefulapproach
incorporatingboth efficiencyandequity considerations arethoseoffered by
Feldstein(1972) and Deaton (1977), However,both approaches requirea
prior specification of the socialwelfarefunction,includingvaluesof its para-
meters,e.g.,thesocialmarginalutility of income.HABITO: EQUITY-EFFICIENCY TRADEOFFS 59
MethodologicalIssues
The analysisrequiresthe derivation of a tradeoff locusof equity
and efficiency impacts of alternative tax policies, or what is essen-
tially a "production possibility frontier" of equity and efficiency
that can be yielded by all feasible tax structures, given fixed gov-
ernment revenues (Figure la). In practice, this frontier would be
derived as a linear-segmented curve connecting a discrete number
of tax structures, illustrated by points A to G in Figure lb, where
each point would be associatedwith a specific tax structure. The
points of this curve are derived by simulating alternative tax struc:-
turesusing a CGE model of the Philippine economy developed for
the purpose. The model aggregates the economy into 18 production
sectors,11 householdgroupsand three primary factors (Table 1). As
it isthe model's application that isstressedin this paper, refer then to
Habito (1984) or (1986) for a more complete documentation of the
model. The CGE approachrepresentsa significant improvement over
past analyseson tax policies, which involved numerous assumptions
on tax shifting becauseof their partial equilibrium framework. In
contrast, these CGE simulations explicitly account for the inter-
action of the different sectorsof the economy in responseto tax
policy changes.
Three procedural issueshad to be resolvedprior to the equity-
efficiency analysis undertaken here. First, appropriate indicators
of the efficiency and equity effects of alternative taxpolicies hadto
be defined. Efficiency is measuredhereby changesin the economy's
total welfare, which is quantified by the equivalent variation (EV)
resulting from a tax Change. _ The equivalent variation is the change
in income necessaryto bring the consumer to the post-tax reform
level of utility if no reform hadtaken place.To measureincome dis-
tribution effects, the familiar Gini coefficient derived from the
Lorenz curve, isusedwhere a coefficient of zero denotesa perfectly
equitable income distribution, and a higher coefficient (up to unity,
or 100 percent, if defined asan index) denotesgreater inequality of
incomedistribution. The Gini index iscomputed over real disposable
incomesto incorporate cost-of-living effects of tax changes.
2. Whileoutput(i.e.,GDP) mightbe a logicalmeasure of efficiency, it
canbeshownto beaninadequate indicator of efficier_cy effects,because higher
aggregate output neednot imply higheraggregate welfare.Thus,we measure
efficiencyimpacts using equivalent variation. SeeHabito(1984)for afullerdis-
cussion of theseissues.60 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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I0. Cement and Nonmetallic Mineral Products
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The second issue is the need to define the exact nature of the
range of tax structures that would yield the expected tradeoff. The
approach is to define a series of tax structures that range from prog-
ressive (i.e., distribution-improving) to regressive (i.e., distribution-
worsening). For direct taxation, a divergence in equity impacts
is easily achieved; one only needs to vary the tax rates imposed on
the various household groups such that rates are higher on higher in-
come groups to achieve progresstvity, and the reverse to achieve
regressivity. It is less straightforward to determine the structure
of a regressive indirect tax package or a progressive one. For this,
it is necessary to rank the 18 goods in the model on the basis of
income elasticities to determine which goods need to be taxed
more heavily to yield a regressive or progressive system of indirect
taxes. A progressive tax scheme would tax those goods with higher
income elasticities more heavily. Table 2 shows how the 18 goods
rank on this basis; thus, a tax on transport equipment is progressive,
but a tax on processed food and tobacco would be regressive.
TABLE 2
RANKING OF GOODSBY INCOME ELASTICITIES
Rank Sector Sector
No. Name
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The third issue is the need to keep real government revenues
constant across all tax simulations to assure comparability of all
alternative tax structures simulated. This is accomplished by intro-
ducing another equilibriating variable into the CGE model, i.e.,
a scaling factor (TXF) that adjusts tax rates uniformly up or down
until the desired level of (constant) real government income is
achieved.3
Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff Curves
The CGE model used for this analysisused1974 asthe bench-
mark equilibrium year, and was run for three forward equilibria
covering the years 1976, 1978 and 1980. Thus, model simulations
may be interpreted asmedium-term analysesof effects of tax policy
changes.Simulations were undertaken such that tax changeswere
made to take effect in 1976, and the effects describedbelow were
determined for 1980, i.e., four yearsafter the policy change.
Three setsofexperimentshavebeenruntoderivethe tradeoffcurve.
The first modifies salestaxes to achievevarying levelsof progressivi-
ty, while keepingother tax ratesat their 1974 levels.The secondset
of experiments examines tax structures where there are no indirect
taxes, with higher household income taxes compensating for the
eliminated salestax revenues.The third setsimulatesa tax structure
where income taxes are quadrupled over their 1974 values,with a
correspondingdecrease in salestax rates to maintain the basecase
real revenuelevels.
SalesTax Experiments
Table 3 givesalternative salestax rate patterns of varying prog-
ressivity/regressivityused to derive the equity-efficiency locus for
sales _xcs. Table 4 and Figure 2 show the efficiency and equity
effects of these salestax structures. The alternative tax packages
presented here tend to define a "frontier" for each type of tax
formulation. 4
3. This technique is discussed in greaterdetailin Shoven andWhalley
(1977).
4. Many other tax structuresthat were tried yielded efficiency-equity
combinations lying within the frontier, andarethereforenotof interest;hence,
theyarenot presented here,TABLE 3
SALESTAX EXPERIMENTS
Sector Base SB1 SB2 SB3 . SB4 SB5 SB6 SB7 SB8
SalesTax Rates(%)
1 2.42 12.00 12.00 8.07 5.90 1.75 0.00 0.59 0.20
2 6.77 0.00 0.00 4.51 5.90 8.32 6.00 5.86 4.70
3 6.29 0.00 0.00 3.56 5.90 10.07 12.00 11.13 10.00
4 5.73 18.0 15.00 8.54 5.90 0.88 0.00 0.29 0.t 0
5 2.69 0,00 0,00 6.64 5,90 4,38 2,00 2,34 1.20
6 3.50 0.00 0.00 5.22 5.90 7.01 5.00 4.69 3.30 c
7 4.51 0.00 0.00 0.95 5.90 14.89 25.00 23.44 32.80 m Z
> 8 3.59 0.00 0.00 5.69 5.90 6.13 4.00 3,52 2.10 r"
9 21.84 0.00 2.00 6.64 5.90 4.38 2.00 2,34 1.20 o "11
l0 3.14 0.00 0.00 2.85 5.90 t 1.39 18.00 17,58 17.60 _ "r
1t 3.00 0.00 0.00 ] ,90 5.90 13.14 21.00 20,51 24.60
12 5.78 0.00 0.00 0.47 5.90 15.77 25.00 25,00 37.50
13 9.43 0.00 10.00 7.59 5.90 2.63 1.00 1.17 O.50 z I"11
14 7.23 0.00 0.00 4.51 5.90 8.32 6.00 5,86 4.70 o m
15 6.05 0.00 8.00 6.64 5.90 4.38 2.00 2,34 1.20 < 1'1'7
16 8.42 0.00 0.00 1.90 5.90 13.14 21.00 20.51 22.60
17 9.16 0.00 0.00 1.90 5.90 13.14 2t .00 20.5i 26.70
18 3.64 0.00 0.00 3.56 5.90 10.07 12.00 11.13 10.00 zm
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TABLE4
SALES TAX EXPERIMENTS: RESULTSFOR1980
Experiment Gini Total
Code Index EV GDP
SB1 58.5 845.3 178423
SB2 57.8 902.3 176823
SB3 56.8 1100.0 174468
SB4 56.3 1084.9 173031
SB5 55.3 774.7 169801
SB6 54.9 534.2 167858
SB7 54.7 401.2 ] 66766
SB8 54.7 120.1 166375
The set of feasible salestax structuressimulated rangesfrom an
extremely regressivescheme, where the only goods taxed are food
and agricultural products, to a very progressivescheme,where tax
rat:eson goods figuring heavily in higher income groups': budgets
go as high as37 percent. The resultingGini indexesfor 1980, four
years after the tax change, range from 54.7 to 58.5, whereas the
index would have been 55.9 without any tax change(i.e., the base
case). The improvement in efficiency, as measuredby total equi-
valent variation, ranges from P120 million to P1,153 million, re-
presenting 0.07 to 0.67 percent of the base case1980 GDP, res-
pectively.
The locusof efficiency-equity combinationsdefined by the sales
tax experiments exhibits a bowed-out shape, indicating that more
and more equity can be obtained only at a higherefficiency cost,
and vice versa. Indeed, Figure 2 indicatesthatthere isa maximum
efficiency that can be reachedthrough salestaxation given a revenue
constraint, beyond which any attempt to attain more efficiency by
sacrificingmore equity (i.e., beyond SB3, towardsSB2 and SB1) be-
comes counterproductive, leading only to lessefficiency in the tax
systemaswell.
From Figure 2, it is evident that the basecasetax structure was
suboptimal; the basecaseliescompletely within the efficiency-equity
frontier. It is clear that tax reform was indeeddesirable;it can be
said that on both equity and efficiency grounds, the 1974 salestax
structure wastaxing the wrong goodsat the wrong relative rates.Equivalent Variation (PM)
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Income Tax Experiments
Table 5 gives seven household income tax schedules that yield
the same real government revenuesas in the base case if indirect
taxes are completely eliminated. Experiments IT1 to IT4 represent
progressiveschedules,IT5 givesa flat income tax, and IT6 and IT7
represent regressiveschedules.The summary measuresof equity and
efficiency impacts of thesetax schemesare shown on Table 6, and
Figure 3 illustrates these equity-efficiency combinations. One im-
mediately striking i_esult from Figure 3 isthe apparent absenceof a
tradeoff, i.e. the progressivityof the income tax can be changedover
a wide rangewith Little effect on total welfare. However, this result
is partly explained by the specification of the CGE model usedfor
the simulations, wherein labor supply hasbeen modelled exogenous-
ly. Thus, labor supply hasin effect beenspecifiedto be perfectly in-
elastic and hence invariant with the rate of income tax. The income
tax therefore becomesnondistortive asfar asfactor suppliesare con-
cerned.
The nature of the efficiency-equity locus obtained in Figure 3
has an important implication; it indicatesthat attempts to improve
the distributional impact of the tax system by increasingthe role Of
progressiveincome tax (i.e., as against indirect taxation) will have
little cost to society in terms of its efficiency impacts. Note, how-
ever, that the apparentabsenceofa tradeoff may bedueto the model's
failure to provide for endogenous labor supply. However, to the
extent that labor suppliesare highly inelastic - and empirical evi-
dence seemsto bear this out - the above interpretation would be
valid. If there isgood reasonto believe that labor Supplyelasticities
are indeed low, then the resultssuggestthat a move to increasethe
role of direct taxation to the extent madepossibleby administrative
and political constraints would be Pareto-improving.
Income Tax.Sales Tax Combinations
To test the above assertion,a seriesof tax simulations were run
wherein (1) salestaxes were combined with income taxes, and
(2) income tax rateswere raised to four times their 1974 levels.The
alternative salestax rates were patterned after the "SB" seriesof
Table 3 for the sake of comparison, but scaleddown to allow the in-
creasein income taxes while maintaining the basecasereal govern-
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Code Index EV GDP
ITI 53.1 816.9 168710
IT2 53.2 878.0 169308
IT3 54.1 854.9 170472
IT4 55.1 900.1 171851
IT5 56.8 839.1 174006
IT6 58.7 840.9 176872
IT7 60.9 635.4 178381
experiments are summarized in Table 7, and the simulation results
are presented in Table 8. Figure 4 shows the resulting equity-efficien-
cy locus, in comparison to that derived from the earlier "SB" series.
As expected, a general improvement is achieved by increasing the
role of income taxation in the tax system; most of the tax schemes
under'the original "SB" series are dominated by the "ISB" series of
tax structures, the exceptions being only the highly regressive struc-
tures. The country's recent shift to gross income taxation effectively
represents movement in this direction, and is discussed in greater
detail in a later section.
The Overall Frontier
Figure 5 combines the equity-efficiency loci that have been pre-
sented individually in Figures 2 to 4, and gives a general concept of
the overall equity-efficiency frontier with respect to general tax poli-
cy. one significant observation that can be made from the combined
frontier is the relatively narrow range of income distributions that
can be efficiently attained through alternative tax policies. It appears
impossible to achieve an income distribution beyond a Gini index
of 53 percent with a progressive income tax that remains within the
bounds of political feasibility. On the other hand, no further improve-
ment in efficiency (in welfare terms) can be achieved by sacrificing
income distribution beyond a Gini index of 57 percent. This observa-
tion i/ldicates the limited potential of the tax system for effecting
substantial improvements in income distribution, at least in the
medium term. Nevertheless, in view of the commonly observedHABITO:EQUITY-EFFICIENCY TRADEOFFS 71
TABLE 7
COMBINED INCOME TAX AND SALES TAX
EXPERIMENTS: TAX RATES
(In percent)
Sector ISB1 ISB2 ISB3 ISB4 ISB5 ISB6 ISB7 ISB8
SalesTax Rates(%)
1 8.0 6.8 4.6 3.4 1.0 0.0 013 0.1
2 0.0 0.0 2.6 3.4 4.7 3.4 3.4 2.7
3 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.4 5.8 6.8 6.3 5.7
4 11.4 8.6 4.9 3.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1
5 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.4 2.5 1.1 1.3 0.7
6 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.4 4.0 2.9 2.7 1.9
7 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.4 8.5 14.3 13.3 18.7
8 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.4 3.5 2.3 2.0 1.2
9 0.0 1.1 3.8 3.4 2.5 1.1 1.3 0.7
10 0.0 0.0 1.7 3.4 6.5 10.3 10.0 10.0
11 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.4 7.5 12.0 11.7 14.0
12 0.0 0.0 0:3 3.4 9.0 14.3 14.3 21.4
13 0.0 5.7 4.3 3.4 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.3
14 0.0 0.0 2.6 3.4 4.7 3.4 3.4 2.7
15 0.0 4.6 3.8 3.4 2.5 1.1 1.3 0.7
16 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.4 7.5 12.0 11.7 12.9
17 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.4 7.5 12.0 11.7 15.2
18 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.4 5.8 6.8 6.3 5.7
HouseholdTa._Rates(%)
1 0.12 5 0.44 9 2.60
2 0.12 6 0.56 10 17.16
3 0.16 7 1.92 11 10.76




Experiment Gini Total GDP
Code Index EV
ISB1 56.0 1034.1 173556
ISB2 55.6 964.2 172600
ISB3 54.9 967.2 170912
ISB4 54.6 927.3 169901
ISB5 54.0 583.7 167891
ISB6 53.7 670.6 166929
ISB7 53.8 597.7 166873
ISB8 53.7 490.0 1661.58
stability of the Gini index, even a one percentage point improvement
in the index can be significant, particularly for a developing country
like the Philippines where inequitable distribution of income remains
a major problem..
From Figure 5, complete reliance on a progressive income tax
system appears warranted from the point of view of the more prog-
ressive end_ while greater dominance of indirect sales taxes defines
more efficient but less equitable tax systems, s This is consistent
with the commonly-held view with regard to the choice between
direct and indirect taxation. To quote from Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980):
.... In muchpopulardiscussion onecandiscern a formof assignment
of instrumentsto targets:directtaxationisassigned to theequityob-
jective,and indirect taxation is assignedto the goal of raising revenue
efficiently. The rationale typically given.... is that indirect taxation,
even differentiated according to luxuries and necessities, is a poor re-
distributive instrument... (originalitalics)
5. Obviously,there is no need to be limited to the distincttax structures
simulated in the above analysis,i.e., the choiceof alternative salestax structures
is by no means discrete. The fifteen tax experiments chosen for this analysis
(sixof whichdefined the salestax frontier) weremeant simplyto definethe shape
of the equity-efficiency frontier. It is possible to "interpolate'tax structures
other than those usedhere.HABITO; EQUITY.EFFICIENCY TRADEOFFS 73
EqulvalentVariction (PM)
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Thus, a compromisebetween the efficiency and equity goals
must necessarily involve a combination of'the two types of tax,
with the dominance of one or the other determining whether the
econom_ better achievesefficiency or equity objectives.
Recent PhilippineTax Reforms: An Assessment
Having obtained an indication of the efficiency-equity tradeoff
defined by sales and income taxation in the Philippines,there is
now a need to examine someof the more significant tax reforms un-
dertaken by the government after 1974. For the presentanalysis,the
adjustmentsin the structure of salesand specifictaxes,and the shift
to an income tax system basedon grossincome are highlighted.The
primary motivation for this analysis isto determine how these res-
pective reforms relate to the equity.efficiency frontier derivedin
the previous section. Thus, it can be determined whether the tax
reforms actually improved the tax system and whether further
improvements in tax policy can be made (i.e., if the economy re-
mainswithin the frontier).
IndireCt Taxes
There are four major types of indirect taxes in the Philippines:
(1) the salestax, (2) the specific tax, (3) the export tax, and (4) the
import duty. Excise taxes (i.e., sales and specific taxes) have
accounted for the largest proportion of indirect tax revenues in
recent years, while the importance of import and export duties has
steadily declined. For the most part, this trend hasbeen due to the
increasein petroleum product taxation in the pastdecade.
The structure of salestaxes underwent major changesin 1977;
prior to that year, goods were taxed differentially accordingto four
major categories:processedfood (essentials)at 5 percent, ordinary
Commoditiesat 7 percent, semi luxuries at 40 percent, and luxuries
(non essentials)at 70 percent. These rates were changedin 1977
to 5, 10, 25 and 50 percent, respectively. 6 Some changeswere also
introduced in the differential treatment of imported goodsvis-a-vis
their locally-producedcounterparts.
6. The reader isreferred toManasan (1981)for amoredetailed documen-
rationof thePhilippine taxsystem.76 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Certain products are subject to fixed specific taxes per physical
unit in lieu of ad valorem salestaxes, the most important ones being
tobacco product_, alcoholic beveragesand refined petroleum pro-
ducts. Specific taxes were likewise redefined in 1977. Of parti-
cular interest are the specific taxes on refined petroleum products,
which had undergone changesat the averageof once every two years
since 1973. The result had been a general increase in the tax rate on
refined petroleum products, to the extent that petroleum tax reve-
nues now account for over 20 percent of total tax revenues in the
country.
The effective sales tax rates used in the base case run of the
model (shown in Table 3) were computed by dividing net indirect
taxes by the total output of eachsector, asgiven in the 1974 input-
output table of the Philippines. These rates therefore represent ave-
ragesfor each sector, reflecting aggregation of sectors that may be
subject to different rates, plus some amount of tax evasion. In order
to model the changes in excise taxes introduced in 1977, the base
case effective rates were modified to reflect the known changesin
the tax law. The approach has been to simply scale the base case
tax rates up or down by a factor that summarizesthe introduced tax
changes, duly accounting for relative weights in sectors aggregat-
ing goods subject to different rates. The most dominant changesare
the reduction of the rates on luxuries and semi luxuries (from 70
and 40 percent to 50 and 25 percent, respectively), the increase in
the rates on ordinary articles (from 7 to 10 percent), and the change
in specific taxes for tobacco,alcohol and petroleum products. Table 9
summarizes the post-1977 tax rates used in the model.
Table 10 and Figure 6 show the results of simulations with the
modified sales tax structure. It can be seen that the sales tax
changes actually moved the economy even farther away from the
equity-efficiency frontier. As can be seenfrom Figure 6, an improve-
ment in society's welfare could be achieved by moving towards a
uniform salestax rate (SB4), with hardly any distributional impact.
The biggest source of inefficiency in the sales tax structure
appears to be the disproportionate amount of taxation borne by re-
fined petroleum products, which was exacerbated by further in-
creasesin their specific tax rates after 1974. It may be noted that, of
all indirect taxes in the Philippines, those on refined petroleum prod-
ucts have changed the most frequently, having been used by the
government as an instrument for its petroleum pricing policy. TheEQUITY.EFFICI ENCYTRADEOFFS 77
TABLE 9
SALES TAXES USED IN MODEL BEFORE
AND AFTER REFORMS




















SALES TAX REFORM SIMULATION RESULTS (1980)
EQUITY/EFFICIENCY PRE- POST-
MEASURE ' REFORM REFORM
Gini index 55.94 55.85
Total EV
(Million Pesos) 0 -360.03
GDP
(Million Pesos) 171423 170771Equivalent Variation ('P'M}.
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generally upward trend in the rate of petroleum taxation appears
to be solely motivated by revenue-generation objectives, and indi-
cates that the government considers refined petroleum products
as the most convenient target for this purpose. The 1984 increases
in petroleum taxation, which the government made no secret of in
its revenue-raising objective, once again bore this out. However,
the analysis suggeststhat a better way of raising the required addi-
tional tax revenueswould= have been to spread out the increased tax
rates among the different sectors of the economy to achievea more
uni=form rate. There appears to be little justification beyond admi-
nistrative convenience for concentrating the increased sales tax
ratesonthe petroleum sector._
Gross Income Taxation
Prior to 198!, all citizens and resident working aliens with a
grossannual incomeof at leastP1,800 were subject to the personal
income tax, with rates ranging from 3 percent for net taxable in-
comes below P2,000 to a maximum of 70 percent, progressing
through 37 step brackets. Net taxable income was computed as in-
come from all sourcesnet of allowable exemptions and deductions,
which includedmedical expenses,school tuition for dependents in
high school, business expenses, losses, interest payments, depre-
ciation, charitable contributions and 10 percentof the grossincome
of a working spouse,eachsubjectto a givenmaximum.
The personal income tax system underwent major changesin
1981, when personaldeductions were eliminated for wageand salary
income and income tax rateswere restructured.The exemption level
was raised from P1,800 to P3,000 per annum. Income is now cate-
gorized either as grosscompensation income, defined as all income
resulting from an employee-employer relationship (e.g., wages,
salaries,bonuses,allowances, etc), or grossincome, which refers to
all other income (e.g., income from businessor profession). While
the usualdeductions may still be claimedon the latter, only personal
and dependent exemptions (up to a maximum of four dependents)
may be claimed by persons who earn only compensation income.
Taxable compensation income, defined as gross compensation
7. The only othervalid reason for taxing petroleum products heavily
wouldbe for itsconservation effect, i.e.,thetax compensates for the external
social cost(in termsof stabilityandsecurity) of heavyreliance onimported oil.
Thepresent analysis ignores such "Pigouvian tax" effects.80 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT ,
income net of exemptions, and net taxable income, defined asgross
income net of exemptions and deductions, are subject to different
tax schedules, shown in Table 11. The tax schedules have beensub-
stantially simplified from the previous 37 step brackets to 11 for
taxable compensation income and 5 for net taxable income.
Personal income taxes have been specified in the model as aver-
age tax rates which vary across income groups. This treatment is
particularly restrictive, becausethe model takes the averageand mar-
ginal tax ratesto be identical. However;the inaccessibility of detailed
income tax data precluded a more precise modelling of the income
tax structure for this work. In order to reconcile the statutory pre-
reform tax rates with actual data which determined the averagerates
used in the model, the following assumptions were made:
(a) Tax evasion/underreporting rates increase progressively from
10 percent for the sixth income group to 60 percent for the
highest income group; and
(b) Claimed deductions amount to 10 percent of net income for
all taxpaying income groups except for the top income
group, which claims 50 percent deductions.
On the basis of each income group's average income per household
and the above assumptions, the statutory prereform tax rates become
consistent with the averagetax rates implied by the.data and used in
the model (seeTable 12).
Translating the postreform tax structure into average tax rates
for the model is further complicated by the discriminatory treatment
of compensation income and noncompensation income, where
deductions cannot be claimed on the former. The income tax
changes are also expected to increase the tax baseby bringing about
some reduction in tax evasion, as well as a reduction in the amount
of deductions claimed where they are allowed. Thus, the assumptions
made above cannot be directly applied for the prereform caseto the
postreform tax structure. While it is hard to determine by how much
tax evasion and deduction rates have been reduced under the new
system, three alternative assumptions for the analysis are made using
10 percent, 25 percent and 50 percent reductions alternatively.
Under the new structure, the averagefamily with 4.4 children would
claim exemptions amounting to P14,000 (P6,000 for head of family
and P2,000 each for the maximum four dependents allowed). Thus,
household income must exceed P14,000 for a household to pay any
income tax. On the basis of 1980 average incomes, it can thereforeTABLE 11 z
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TABLE 12
TRANSLATING PRE-REFORM INCOME TAXES INTO
AVERAGE TAX RATES FOR THE MODEL
Income Average AssumedAssumedAverage Implied Rate
Group 1974 Evasion Deduc- Taxes AvgTax Usedin
Income Rate tion Rate Paid* Rate Model
(Pesos) (%) (%) (Pesos) (%) (%)
1 1,207 ** ** 0 0.00 0.03
2 2,362 ** ** 0 0.00 0.03
3 3,307 ** ** 0 0.00 0.04
4 4,614 ** ** 0 0.00 0.02
5 6,370 ** ** 0 0.00 0.11
6 8,675 10 10 11.00 0.12 0.14
10,138 10 10 46.55 0.46 0.48
8 15,995 40 10 71.82 0.45 0.45
9 20,707 47 10 133.03 0.64 0.65
10 49,889 48 10 2,111.37 4.23 4.29
11 127,982 60 50 3,392.03 2.65 2.69
be assumed that the lowest six income groups pay no income tax
without significant departure from reality. Table 13 presents the
derivation of the average tax rates implied under the new system,
given the alternative assumptions on reduction of tax evasion and
deduction rates-deductions cannot go below 10 percent because one
can always opt for the standard deduction of 10 percent of net in-
come. These are the rates used for the simulations of the new in-
come tax structure.
The equity and efficiency effects of the tax change are present-
ed in Table 14, and illustrated in Figure 7. Compared to the base
case, the change in the structure of the income tax leads to no sig-
nificant effect on the distribution of income. Nor is there any
significant efficiency effect; the change in tax structure either leads
to a small increase (28.6 million pesos) or small decrease (5.53 mil-
lion pesos) in welfare depending on the assumption of improvement
in tax collection. Similarly, the change in GDP from the base tax
structure tends to be minimal, ranging from -Pl10 million toHABITO:EQUITY-EFFICIENCY TRADEOFFS 83
TABLE 13
DERIVATION OF IMPLIED AVERAGE TAX RATES FROM
GROSS INCOME TAXATION
Group Income Rate Deduc- Paid** Rate




1 1,600 na na 0 0.00
2 3,233 na na 0 0.00
3 4,791 na na 0 0.00
4 6,985 na na 0 0.00
5 9,655 na na 0 0.00
6 13,349 na na 0 0.00
7 16,374 9 10 40.94 0.25
8 25,522 36 10 104.64 0.41
9 33,628 42 10 248.85 0.74
10 81,388 43 10 1,839.37 2.26
11 187,419 54 45 4,179.44 2.23
25% Improvement in Collection:
1 1,600 na na 0 0.00
2 3,233 na na 0 0.00
3 4;791 na na 0 0.00
4 6,985 na na 0 0.00
5 9,655 na na 0 0.00
6 13,349 na na 0 0.00
7 16,374 7.5 10 50.76 0.31
8 25,522 30 10 173.55 0.68
9 33,628 35 10 353.09 1.05
10 81,388 36 10 2,490.47 3.06
11 187,419 45 37.5 7,796.63 4.16
50% Improvement in Collection:
1 1,600 na na 0 0.00
2 3,233 na na 0 0.00
3 4,791 na na 0 0.00
4 6,985 na na 0 0.00
5 9,655 na na 0 0.00"" 84 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPI NEDEVELOPMENT
Table3 (Continued)
Deduc-
Group Income Rate tion Paid** Rate
(Pesos) (%) Rates* (Pesos) (%)
(%)
6 13,349 na na 0 0,00
7 16,374 5 10 70.41 0.43
8 25,522 20 10 288.40 1.13
9 33,628 23.5 10 474.15 1.41
10 81,388 25 10 3,654.32 4.49
11 187,419 30 25 15,162.20 8.09
*Cannot be lessthan 10 percent becausetaxpayers can always opt for the
standard10 percentdeduction.
**Based on the incometax scheduleprevailing in 1974.
TABLE 14
INCOME TAX REFORM SIMULATION RESULTS (1980)
Post-Reform
Equity/Efficiency Pre-Reform % ReductionIn Tax Evasion
Measure (BaseCase) 10 25 50
Gini Index 55.94 55.87 55.86 55.87
Total EV
(Million Pesos) 0 28.61 20.21 5.53
GDP
(Million Pesos) 171,423 171,312 171,234 171,143EquivalentVariation (,IBM) -I-
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-P280 million, or a .06 to .16 percent drop. However, these results
are again partly due to the failure of the model to capture welfare
or output effects due to the labor-leisure choice of individuals, be-
cause labor supplies are assumed fixed in the model. This would not
be a serious omission if the labor supply elasticities of households
were small; and although the evidence on this is not conclusive, most
estimates do tend to bear this out. The results indicate that the tax
changehas not appreciably affected households'welfare arisingfrom
their consumption behavior.
To the extent that the improved tax administration could lead
to increased income tax revenue collection, these results suggest
that the shift to grossincome taxation was a neutral revenue-en-
hancing measure.This can be seen from the negligibleshift in the
economy's position relative to the equity-efficiency frontier attain-
able through tax policy, s This supports the increasingly popular
argument that, given the limited shareof total tax revenuesaccount:
ed for by income taxes in the Philippines, any move that increases
its rolevis-a-visindirecttaxes would be beneficial.
Conclusions
This study was motivated by the need for an operational ap-
proach for making tax policy choiceson the basisof their equity and
efficiency impacts, and by the lack of a generalequilibrium frame-
work for assessingPhilippine tax policies. Simulations with a com-
putable general equilibrium model of the Philippine economy made
it possible to quantify the efficiency and equity impacts of alter-
native tax structures. By deriving an "equity-efficiency frontier"
achievable through tax policy, an assessment of recent tax reforms
becamepossible,and ledto the following observations:
1. The salestax reforms of 197"] worsened the economy's position
relative to the equity-efficiency frontier. The distributional
impact of the salestax system does not seemto be appreciably
8. Theseresults are largelyconsistent with thefindingsof Castelo et al.
(1984), exceptfor their apparentlyerroneousconclusion that grossincome
taxationledto reduced government revenues. Thisobservation wasduetotheir
exclusion of capitalgainstaxesfrom the measured revenues underthe new
system,whereas they werepart of the measured revenues for the previous in-
cometaxsystem.HABITO: EOUITY-EFFI CIENCY TRADEOFFS 87
affected, but there is a clear efficiency cost. This hasapparently
been caused by the further increase in the rate of petroleum
product taxation, which had already accounted for a dispropor-
tionately largeshareof indirecttaxation prior to the tax reforms.
2. The recentshift to grossinc_ome taxation appearsto haveraised
the collectible revenuesfrom the income tax with little coston
the efficiency and equity impact of the tax. Thus, the change
represents a positive reform, especially because it permits an
increase in the role of the income tax without substantially
changing individual tax burdens. This has been accomplished
mainly through the improvement of administrativeefficiency and
collection ratesthat the grossincometax systempermits.
3. There isa goodargument for increasingthe role of direct income
taxation in the Philippine tax system, which has traditionally
been dominated by indirect taxes. These simulations show that
direct taxation can be used to improve equity in the economy
without any appreciabledecline in aggregatewelfare.
The precedinganalysishasindicated that, evenafter the reforms
of 1977 and 1981, there remains much scope for improvement of
the Philippine tax system. By explicitly deriving the alternativesde-
fining an equity-efficiency frontier, the approach demonstrated can
provide government policymakers with the alternative directions
which tax policy cantake to effect suchan improvement.
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